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Saddam Hussein on Trial – A Legal Analysis

A father whose 19 year old son was executed by the Government’s
security forces in connection with the Al-Sadr uprising of 1999
reflected on his strong desire for revenge but concluded:

“That is not the way…I have seen my life and I have buried my
son…I want justice.”1

I.

INTRODUCTION

With the questioning of Saddam Hussein in front of the Iraqi High Criminal Court2 on October 19,
2005,3 a trial began that has been labelled by some as “the trial of the century4”. Whether this is true
or not, the proceedings in Baghdad receive high publicity and are under close scrutiny bymajor
human rights organisations5, legal experts6, and indeed the general public, as the news coverage is
extensive. Why does the trial attract so much attention one may wonder and why do so many people
care about ensuring fair proceedings for an ex-dictator on trial for major human rights violations, a
dictator that himself made extensive use of a special Revolutionary Court guaranteeing fast
executions but by no means due process of law.
1

Human Rights Watch, Ali Hassan Majid and the Basra Massacre of 1999, February 2005, at 23; Human Rights Watch
Briefing Paper, at 18, available at: http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq1005/index.htm. (All Websites quoted last
visited: April 16, 2006).
2
The court was formerly known as Iraqi Special Tribunal, it has subsequently been renamed.
3
“Hussein’s First Trial is Opening but Clarity May Still be Far Off”, New York Times, October 18, 2005, at A1.
4
See Michael Scharf, “Grotian Moment: The Hussein Trial Blog”, “Is the Saddam Hussein Trial one of the most
important trials of all time?” Issue # 10, at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/ ;“The Trial of the Century”, CBS
News, April 22, 2006,available at:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/15/news/opinion/courtwatch/main588751.shtml.
5
See Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, supra note 1; “Iraq – Iraqi Special Tribunal – Fair trials not guaranteed”,
Amnesty International, available at:
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/iraq/document.do?id=82AFEE4B414DC6D180256FE90052E0E1
6
See e.g. “Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog”, supra note 4; Ash Ü Bali, “Justice under Occupation,
Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq”, 30 Yale J. Int`l L. 431-472 ; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “PostConflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal” Cornell Int`l L.J. 101-166; Michael A. Newton,”The
Iraqi Special Tribunal: A Human Rights Perspective”, available at:
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Newton_Article_on_the_IST.pdf.
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In answering this question the optimistic legal scholars might first of all point to the fact that - as
will be discussed later - international law requires a fair trial and for those who believe in the rule of
law, this will indeed be an important reason to turn their eyes towards Baghdad.

But there is more to it. The trial held in the fortified “Green Zone” in the middle of Baghdad is
special in many ways.

First there is the hope that this trial might serve as a model for Iraq and might help to re-establish
trust in the judicial system and its protection against the deprivation of rights which has been
strongly eroded by the past 23 years of Saddam’s reign and to thereby allow the country a “new
start” based on firm legal principles. In order to help Iraq through the very delicate transition phase,
shifting away from a violent suppressive dictatorship towards a fragile new democracy, the trial will
need to open avenues for reconciliation, provide justice for those whose rights were violated and
publicly acknowledge the atrocities that have happened in the past decades.7

Further more by holding Saddam accountable, the current criminal proceedings add yet another
name to the list of recent precedents in which heads of state had to face charges for violating
international law.8 The trial might thereby serve as another mosaic stone in establishing the rule of
law and deter others from stepping over the lines drawn by international agreements and custom in
the area of international criminal law.

7

See also Goldstone, “The Trial of Saddam Hussein: What Kind of Court Should Prosecute Saddam Hussein And
Others For Human Rights Abuses?”, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1490, 2003-2004 at 1503-1504.
8
See the proceedings against General Pinochet in Spain and Chile, against Slobodan Milosevic in front of the ICTY, the
Ex Rwandan Prime Minister Kambanda in front of the ICTR and now against former Liberian Head of State Charles
Taylor in front of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
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However, the trial is also being perceived as closely connected to the heavily criticised U.S. led
invasion of Iraq that has been claimed by many to infringe international law9 and was founded on
assumptions which turned out to be false.10 As the U.S. played a major part in setting up the
tribunal, the trial is in danger of at least being perceived as “victor’s justice” and mere show by the
world audience, finding guilty a dictator who by many - including high officials such as the Iraqi
President Jalal Talabani or the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army President Bush - has already
been declared guilty. 11

To establishing model proceedings in Iraq and avoid mock trial’s the trial needs to be fair. It has
been said that in light of Saddam’s past it would be bitterly ironic to transform him into the “poster
boy for fair trials and due process,”12 which might be true. Nevertheless, it is necessary to do so, in
order to establish a trustworthy and fair judicial system in Iraq, displaying that any accused, even
one considered guilty by so many for the most heinous crimes, will receive a fair trial and be
presumed innocent until otherwise proven.

There is a lot at risk in Iraq at the moment and the world audience is watching. Whether the
proceedings in front of the Iraqi High Criminal Court are fair and legitimate and whether the trial in
Baghdad is the soundest solution to achieve the aforementioned objectives is the subject of this
paper. In addressing it, the factual background will be provided first, followed by the legal analysis.

9

S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) did not authorize the use of force by the coalition as it did not authorize
the use of “all necessary means”, the term commonly employed by the Security Council under Chapter VII. For a
discussion of the legality of the U.S led invasion see e.g : Bellamy, Alex J. “International Law and the War with Iraq”, 4
Melb J. Int`l L. 497 (2003).
10
„U.S. Gives Up Search For Iraq WMD”, BBC News, January, 12, 2005, available under:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4169107.stm.
11
Jalal Talabani: “Saddam Hussein is a war criminal and he deserves to be executed 20 times a day for his crimes
against humanity”, Chicago Tribune, “Talabani Says Saddam Confessed to Crimes”, AP, Published September 7,
2005; Georg W. Bush: “This is a disgusting tyrant who deserves justice, the ultimate justice”, BBC News, December
17, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3326311.stm. See also Abdul Aziz Hakim, leader of the largest political
party in Iraq: “This criminal deserves the death penalty, the highest punishment” Washington Post, “At Chaotic Trial of
Hussein
Iraqi Victims Tell of Torture”, December 6, 2005, at A22.
12
Law Prof. Linda Malone "it is ironic to anyone watching this trial that Hussein, who is such an icon of injustice, is
now trying to transform himself into the poster boy for fair trials and due process.", in “Law Experts Divided Over
Legitimacy of Tribunal”, Los Angeles Times, October 20, 2005.
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II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A) THE INVASION OF IRAQ AND THE INSTALLATION OF THE COURT

To be able to asses the legitimacy of the Court’s installation, it is important to keep the timeline of
the invasion in mind: A U.S. led coalition began its military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003.13
Very short after that, on May 1, 2003, the end of major combat operations was declared by U.S.
President George W. Bush which was followed by a formal occupation of Iraq. After transferral of
the power to the Interim Government on June 28, 2004, the U.S. declared an official end to the
occupation on June 30, 2004. Elections on January 30, 2005, resulted in the construction of a
Transitional National Assembly, which drafted an Iraqi constitution that was adopted by vote on 15,
October 2005.14 Elections for an Iraqi government finally took placeon December 15, 2005.

The Court was installed during the ongoing occupation of Iraq. Only a few days prior to Saddam’s
capture by Coalition Forces on December 13, 200315 the Iraqi Governing Council authorized by, in
cooperation with and subject to the approval of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) - the
administrative body created by the coalition as the occupying power - promulgated the Statute of the
Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) on December 10, 2003.16 The Iraqi Governing Council as the
promulgating body consisted of Iraqi members handpicked by the CPA.17

13

For the following see: “Timeline Iraq, a chronology of key events”, BBC News, available under:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/737483.stm.
14
See “Iraq voters back new constitution”, BBC World News, October 25, 2005, available under:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4374822.stm.
15
BBC “Saddam Hussein captured December 2003”, available under
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_iraq_timeline/html/saddam_captured.stm
16
See: Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 48 with IST Statut as Appendix A , available under :
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Orders; see also: Bassiouni, “Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq”, Cornell Int’l L.J. 101,
at 119-20.
17
“Hussein’s Lawyers Aim to Focus on Occupation”, Wall Street Journal, Oct.2, 2005, at A 9B.
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The U.S. has further been involved through the Department of Defence’s Regime Crimes Liaison
Office, which has played a major role in the tribunal’s installation by training judges and
prosecutors, building courtrooms, providing resources and personnel for investigations or evidence
gathering and by training the court’s staff.18 The U.S. provided for the tribunal’s funding and spend
U.S. $ 75 million dollars19 to install and support it, a sum that has since risen to U.S. $ 128 million.20

On August 11, 2005, the elected Iraqi Transitional Assembly revoked the original IST Statute and
adopted an amended version, which also changed the courts name to Iraqi Higher Criminal Court
(IHCC).21

Saddam’s trial finally began in the trial chamber on October 19, 2005 in which all defendants pled
non guilty. During that time Baghdad was, and to the present time still is, constantly shaken by
terrorist attacks which have not halted before the court room doors. Only a day into the trial, on
October 20, 2005, one of the defence lawyers for Awad Hamed al-Bander,22 former chief justice of
the Iraqi Revolutionary Court who is also on trial before the court, was kidnapped by a group of
armed men and found shot dead later the same day. A few weeks later on Nov. 8, 2005 two other
lawyers representing Saddam’s co defendants were attacked, one of them killed, the other one
seriously wounded.23 This attack brought the number of killings associated with the court up to 8,
including one of its judges.24

18

Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 121-22; Leila Sadat, “Indigenous Solution or (U.S.) Occupation Court ?”, at 2, available
at : http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Leila_Sadat_Indigenous_Solution_or_(U.S.)_Occupation_Court.pdf .
19
See Wall Street Journal, supra note 17, at A 9B.
20
See Leila Sadat, supra note 18, at 2; Human Rights Watch, Briefing paper, supra note 1, at 17;£ 1.2 million were
additionally provided by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, see UK FCO, Frequently Asked Questions on Iraq
available under http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1024313967149
21
There seems to be some confusion conc. the correct English translation of the court’s Arabic name, whereas the
unofficial English translation available under http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/content.asp?id=2 refers to the court
as Iraqi High Criminal Court (the expression used in this paper), Human Rights watch calls it: Supreme Iraqi Criminal
Tribunal, Human Rights Watch Briefing paper, supra note 1; the New York Times refer to it as the Iraqi High
Tribunal, N.Y. Times, “Ambush of Defense Lawyers In Hussein Trial Kills One”, November 8, 2005, at A8
22
See Trial Watch under: http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p407.html.
23
“Ambush of Defense Lawyers In Hussein Trial Kills One”, N.Y. Times, November 9, 2005, at A8.
24
id.

7

Saddam Hussein on Trial – A Legal Analysis

While the U.S. occupation has long ended and the sovereignty is back in the hands of the Iraqi
people, U.S. forces, staff, and infrastructure are still desperately needed to ensure a minimum of
security and stability in the country. Coalition troops are still present in large numbers in Iraq25 and
they are struggling against a strong insurgency that has already killed more U.S. soldiers than the
actual combat operations ever did.26 Sectarian violence has increased dramatically over the last
months and has since then cost hundreds of lives. Many believe that Iraq is either on the verge of a
civil war or already in it.27

B) THE COURT’S JURISDICTION, STRUCTURE & STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The erected court is not part of the regular judiciary system of Iraq. The Court has jurisdiction over
Iraqis as well as non-Iraqi residents in Iraq28 accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed in the territory of Iraq or elsewhere since July 17, 1968 up until May 1, 2003, the
date on which the formal occupation of Iraq began.29 In addition to these three crimes which are also
enlisted in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the
Iraqi statute ads three further crimes30 derived out of and with reference to Iraqi law. These are
described as the “Intervention in the judiciary or the attempt to influence the functions of the
judiciary”, “the wastage and squander of national resources” as well as “the abuse of position and
the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against
an Arab country”.

25

Presently (April 2006) there are 133.000 American troops in Iraq, see Donald Rumsfeld, Radio Interview on WABC
News Talk Radio, N.Y., April 7, 2006, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2006/tr20060407-12841.html
26
See “A look at U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq”, N.Y. Times, November 17, 2005, also available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Iraq-US-Deaths.html.
27
See e.g. “Iraq’s civil war nightmare”, BBC News, 23 February 2006, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4741616.stm, “Iraq in civil war, says former (Iraqi) Prime Minister”, BBC
News, 19 March 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4821618.stm.
28
Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute, Article 1.2, unofficial translation available at:
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf
29
id.
30
IHCC Statute, Articles 14.1, 14.2, 14.3
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The statute declares Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law for applicable31 and therefore relies on inquisitory
criminal proceeding as known in a lot of civil law countries, placing more power and responsibility
on the judge compared to the typical common law adversary system.

The trial is preceded by an investigation performed by an investigative Judge32, who also has the
power to question suspects, witnesses and victims in order to gather evidence. If the Investigative
Judge finds a prima facie case as being established, the Judge will prepare an indictment and refer
the case to the (trial) court33.

The trial chamber of the IHCC consists of five,34 the appeals chamber provided by the statute of nine
judges.35 The Statute requires judges, members of the prosecution committee as well as the court’s
staff36 and the principal defence lawyer of the accused37 to be Iraqi nationals. Non-Iraqis may at the
discretion of the court be approved as advisors to the court38, a non Iraqi judge may however sit in
case a State is one of the parties and this is deemed necessary.39 No Non-Iraqi judge is currently
sitting on the case before the court.40

The court is therefore a truly national court, not an international one as the ICTR, the ICTY or the
ICC or what is referred to as a “hybrid court”, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone which

31

See IHCC Statute Article 16; Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law (English Translation) available at:
http://www.iraqispecialtribunal.org/en/laws/LawOnCriminalProceedings.htm.
32
IHCC Statute, Article 8.
33
IHCC Statute, Article 18.3.
34
IHCC Statute, Article 4.1.
35
IHCC Statute, Article 4.2.
36
IHCC Statute, Article 28.
37
IHCC Statute, Article 19.4 B.
38
IHCC Statute, Article 7.2 (general assistance), Article 8.9 (advisors for Investigative Judges) Article 9.7 (advisors for
prosecutors).
39
IHCC Statute, Article 3.5.
40
Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, supra note 1, at 6.
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(being set up in cooperation with the U.N.) is composed of national as well as international judges,
the latter being nominated by the Secretary General of the U.N.41

The penalties that are prescribed by the statute are those of Iraqi law,42 which does include the death
penalty, usually administered by hanging.43 As Iraqi law does not include crimes like genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity and therefore does not provide for any sentences for perpetrators
of these crimes, the Statute refers to the sentencing for the crimes of murder and rape which are
prohibited under Iraqi law.44 These might be included in one of the crimes punishable under the
Statute such as genocide. A premeditated killing or a killing as a result of the use of toxic substances
or explosives is for example punishable by death under Iraqi law45 and the death penalty might
consequently be imposed if these acts were committed by the accused as part of a war crime,
genocide or crime against humanity. If the crime lacks any counterpart under Iraqi law the Court has
to determine the punishment taking into account factors such as the gravity of the crime and
individual circumstances.46

The trial is televised and broadcasted around the world with a twenty minute delay to allow
censoring and avoid unforeseen events.47 Saddam originally had the right to represent himself (like
Milosevic had) but according to the revised statute he now merely has got the right to “use a lawyer
of his own choosing.48” As the other accused Saddam is represented by legal counsel of his choice in
front of the court. As required by the statute his main defense counsel is Iraqi but he has a defense

41

For more information on the Special Court for Sierra Leone visit the official website under: http://www.scsl.org/index.html.
42
IHCC Statute, Article 24.1.
43
See “3 Set to Hang as Executions Return to Iraq”, N.Y. Times, August 17, 2005.
44
IHCC Statute, Article 24.4.
45
see Paragraph 406 (1) – a, b of the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969, available under:
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi_Penal_Code_1969.pdf
46
IHCC Statute, Article 24.5.
47
For a discussion whether the trial should be televised see Issue # 2, Grotian Moment Blog, supra note 6.
48
IHCC Article 19.4 D.
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team comprised of international jurists, amongst them former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark,49
whose involvement has spurred quite some publicity.

C) THE CASE CURRENTLY BEFORE THE COURT

While Saddam is on trial in Iraq at the time of writing, he is not indicted for the major crimes he
allegedly committed. Besides the ongoing torture and killing of dissidents, these would especially
include the Anfal campaign50 (gassing of Iraqi Kurds – killing 50.000 - 100.000 including the
gassing of the village of Halabja,51 killing 5000 civilians), the 1991 massacre after a Kurdish Shiite
uprising,52 which was encouraged by the coalition forces pulling out of Iraq at the time, the assault
on the Marsh Arabs (including the bombardment of villages, the employment of torture and
disappearances, displacing at least 100.000),53 the waging of war against Iran employing chemical
weapons and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Instead Saddam is being tried for the alleged reprisals after a failed assassination attempt against
him. The incident took place in 1982 in the town of al-Dujail and supposedly led to summary
executions, lengthy imprisonments and show trials with finally 148 people dead. 96 were hanged in
Abu Ghraib prison and 46 died under torture, including four additional inmates who were
accidentally added to the group.54 According to the Iraqi Tribunal this incident was chosen as it is

49

See “Why I`m Willing to defend Hussein”, Ramsey Clark, L.A. Times, 24. January 2005, available at:
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0124-26.htm.
50
See „ The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds”, Human Rights Watch, New York 1993, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/.
51
See “1988 Thousands die in Halabja gas attack”, BBC News, 16. March, 2005 available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm.
52
See Human Rights Watch, „The 1991 Uprising in Iraq And its Aftermath” available at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm.
53
See “Iraq: Devastation of Marsh Arabs”, Human Rights Watch, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/01/iraq012503.htm.
54
“Prosecutors in Husein Case Tie Him to Order to Kill 148” NY Times, March 1, 2006, at A1.
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very well documented and a relatively clear and simple case.55 The prosecution introduced evidence
directly linking Saddam to the executions, including a document which supposedly carried his
signature, signing off the alleged Dujail perpetrators to be executed. It is however not clear with
which crimes within the court’s jurisdiction Saddam has actually been charged as the indictments
have not been made available to the public.56 Looking at the statute it is likely that the killing of 148
men and boys might constitute a crime against humanity within the courts jurisdiction (Art 12 IHCC
Statute), being “wilful murder” as part of a “widespread” but more likely “systematic attack”
directed against the civilian population.

Despite the argument that the Dujail case might be easy to prove, the decision to start the
proceedings with this case is problematic. The IHCC Statute57 requires the punishment issued by the
Court to be executed within 30 days of the date when the judgement becomes final. If Saddam was
sentenced to death this would mean that he might never be put on trial for many of the most
gruesome crimes he allegedly committed which would jeopardize the high hopes that accommodate
the trial in terms of the country’s reconciliation. The injustice done to many victims by Saddam’s
regime needs to be addressed by the criminal proceedings. Although it will hardly be possible to
indict Saddam for every single criminal act, e.g. every torture or disappearance allegedly committed,
major crimes amounting to crimes against humanity or genocide as punishable by the IHCC should
be addressed before the court. It is doubtful to say the least thatsentencing Sad dam for the killings in
Dujail wouldsooth the wounds of those who lost relatives and friends in the Anfal campaign. The
pragmatic approach that the case of Dujail is supposed to be easier to prove and well documented is
unlikely to be accepted by many victims. However, the court might try to find a way around the
execution deadline found in Art. 27.2 and has indeed said that it plans up to 12 trials for Saddam.58

55

See “Hussein’s First Trial Is Opening But Clarity May Still Be Far Off”, NY Times, October 18, 2005, at A11; “The
first case: Dujail”, CBC News Online, October 18, 2005 at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/first_case.html, for
a positive evaluation of this approach see Michael Scharf, Grotian Moment Blog, Issue #11 supra note 6.
56
Human Rights Watch, Briefing Paper, supra note 1, at 6.
57
IHCC Statute Art. 27.2.
58
See „At Trial in Iraq, Witness Tell About Torture”, NY Times, 6, December 2005, at A 11.
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He has now been officially indicted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed in an internal conflict for the Anfal campaign but it is still unclear when the proceedings
in this case are going to start.59

To avoid Saddam’s execution to be carried out the court might for example declare an execution
incompatible with an ongoing proceeding in another case before the court and interpret the provision
in a way that the punishment must be executed within 30 days after a judgement has been issued and
no other proceedings are pending. However this is an exception not provided for by the language of
the statute and it might be criticised as arbitrary and not founded in law.

It should be noted that such an interpretation of the statute would also lead to a situation in which an
accused sentenced to death has to wait for his penalty for what is likely to be several years during
ongoing criminal proceedings. With regards to the extreme psychological stress for the convicted
and the so called “death row phenomenon” this might amount to “cruel and inhumane treatment”
and has for example been declared incompatible with the European Human Rights Convention.60
The Human Rights Committee as the body responsible for interpreting the International Covenant on
Civil and Political rights (ICCPR), which is applicable to Iraq61, has however declined to interpret
the parallel provision in the ICCPR forbidding cruel and inhuman treatment in the same way. 62 The
Committee did not want to lay pressure on states to encourage (speedy) executions.

This dilemma – taking the ECHR point of view that long imprisonment on death row might amount
to cruel and inhumane treatment - would best be solved by excluding the death penalty from the
penalties that might be imposed by the court. Although the death penalty is not prohibited by the
59

See “Hussein Charged with Genocide in 50.000 deaths”, NY Times, April 5, 2006, at A6.
Soering v. United Kingdom, ECHR (1989), Series A, No. 161.
61
See list of ratifications/accessions in U.N. Treaty Database at
http://untreaty.un.org/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partI/chapterIV/treaty5.asp
62
Johnson v. Jamaica (No.588/1004), UN Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/588/1994 (1996); For more information see e.g. Patrick
Hudson, “Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner’s Human Rights under Interantional Law”, EJIL
(2000), Vol. 11 No. 4, 833-856, also available under: http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol11/No4/110833.pdf.
60
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ICCPR there are strong international tendencies in outlawing it63 and it is banned from the Statutes
of the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC.

Along with Saddam seven more people are accused for their alleged involvement in the case,
amongst them are Taha Jassin Ramadan64, Iraq’s former Vice-President, Barsan Ibrahim al-Tikriti,65
who is a younger half brother Saddam’s and former director of general intelligence (Mukhabarat) as
well as Awad Hamed al-Bander,66 former chief justice of the Iraqi Revolutionary Court.

III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A) THE COURT ‘S LEGITIMACY

There are several legal treaties and norms applicable to the installation of the court as well as to the
proceedings in front of it. During the war and especially the time of occupation, in which the original
IST statute was promulgated and the tribunal was installed, the Geneva Conventions and the Hague
Convention67 applied. The U.S. as well as Great Britain are parties to the Conventions.68 The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (commonly referred to as
IV. Geneva Convention)69 includes several provisions governing the powers of an occupying power.
Among these is Article 64 which provides that subject to security threats

63

See Protocol Nr.6 to the European Convention on Human Rights; 2. Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
See Trial Watch under: http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p254.html.
65
See Trial Watch under: http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p147.html.
66
See Trial Watch under: http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p407.html.
67
Online available under: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm.
68
See Treaty Information of the International Committee of the Red Cross under:
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm.
69
On-line available under: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva07.htm.
64

14

Saddam Hussein on Trial – A Legal Analysis

“… and the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of
the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by said
laws.”

Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations compels the occupying power to ensure public order and
safety and to respect the laws in force in the country, unless absolutely prevented.

It has been argued both for and against the legality of the installation of the tribunal based on these
provisions.70 It is clear that the court is a tribunal which was newly created under the control of the
Coalition Provisional Authority and it does not belong to the regular Iraqi legal system. The defence
further more raises the argument that the occupation was illegal under international law and
therefore the installation of the tribunal must also be illegal as it was set up through an official act
during the occupation.71

Defending the Court’s installation it has for example been claimed that the tribunal was necessary as
a measure to “restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety” as provided by Art. 42
of the Hague Regulations just as the Security Council used its obligation to “maintain or restore
international peace and security” to create the ICTR and ICTY under its Chapter VII UNC powers.72

Notwithstanding this dispute the current tribunal receives strong legitimacy through the fact that its
statute has subsequently been amended and approved by the Iraqi Transitional Assembly. The court
is also expressly mentioned and empowered by the Iraqi Constitution.73 Adopted on October 15,
2005, its Article 130 reads as follows:
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“The Iraq High Criminal Court shall continue its duties as an independent judicial body,
in examining the crimes of the defunct dictatorial regime and its symbols. The Council of
Representatives shall have the right to dissolve by law the Iraqi High Criminal Court
after the completion of its work.”

There might still be doubts whether the Iraqis really had the free choice to abandon the court
had they wanted to do so. After all, it had been set up, financed and provided with a full legal
framework and the proceedings had already started. Furthermore the support in troops and the
infrastructural help Iraq receives by the U.S. is substantive and vital for the country.
Nevertheless the court has been approved by the Iraqi people through a direct vote in adopting
the constitution as well as through the Transitional Assembly, a body elected by the Iraqi
people, when it amended the Court’ s Statute.

B) JURISDICTION, NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE & HEAD OF STATE
IMMUNITY

There is little doubt that Iraq has got jurisdiction to prosecute Saddam. Whereas it is generally
recognised that a country can exercise so called universal jurisdiction to trial perpetrators at least for
crimes against humanity and genocide74 there is no need to rely on this principle here, as Iraq is
putting Saddam on trial itself. Under international law a country generally has jurisdiction especially
for crimes committed on its territory, by its citizens or against its citizens. In the case of Saddam
there are therefore numerous links which give Iraqjurisdiction over Saddam: the fact that Saddam is
an Iraqi is a sufficient link to the country for the country to prosecute him for any committed crimes.
Most of the crimes were also allegedly committed in Iraq and further more against Iraqis, eac h factor
independently would also grant the country jurisdiction.
74
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One might wonder if Saddam and his co defendants can be tried for crimes that have not been
prohibited by the Iraqi criminal code such as genocide or crimes against humanity as it is a basic
principle of international law that a crime and its punishment have to be proscribed by law before the
crime has been committed (“nullum crimen sine lege” / “nulla poena sine lege”). But although this
might have still been doubtful during the days of Nuremberg, it is clear that crimes against humanity
and genocide as well as war crimes are prescribed by (international) law today. Genocide is
especially prohibited by the Genocide Convention to which Iraq is a party75 and war crimes are
covered by the Geneva Conventions signed by Iraq.76 Both prohibitions are also recognised by
customary international law just as the prohibition of crimes against humanity is.77 That an
individual can be put on trial based on these international norms has been clearly established and is
enshrined in customary international law today looking at the precedents of Nuremberg and Tokyo
as well as those set through the ICTR and the ICTY. The 100 ratifications of the ICC statute78
provide further evidence of general support to prosecutethe aforementioned international crimes.

As the issue of head of state immunity has been brought up in connection with Saddam’s case79 it
shall also be addressed here briefly. Looking at the developments in international law especially
during the last decade it is now pretty clear that Saddam could not raise the defence of head of state
immunity under international law was he facing an international tribunal or foreign court. Head of
state immunity is derived from the state’s sovereignty which generally is protected against intrusions
or aggression from other sovereign states under international law. But as Saddam’s home country
Iraq is putting him on trial, the discussion that arouse around the planned trial of Pinochet in Spain,
Milosevic in The Hague or the Ex-Rwandan Prime Minister Kambanda before the ICTR does not
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have to be repeated here. There might be a problem of head of state immunity granted by Iraqi law.
Such a national immunity would however not impose any restrictions on other states to persecute
Saddam and Iraq would infringe its international obligations arising out of the cited conventions by
not putting Saddam on trial for the international crimes prohibited by them.

C) FAIR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Iraq (just as the U.S. and the United Kingdom are) is a party to the International Covenant for
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)80 which in its Art. 14 sets numerous basic minimal
requirements for a fair trial such as the presumption of innocence, the right of the accused to be
informed promptly of any charges against him or the right to receive a trial without undue
delay.

The statute and its application have been closely analysed by Amnesty International81 and Human
Rights Watch82 who both have criticized various shortcomings. It however has to be acknowledged
as a starting point that the IHCC statute does include the basic guarantees requested by the “list” in
the ICCPR.83

Nevertheless insufficient access of the accused to their defense counsels during the investigation
phase has been criticised as well as a lack of equality of arms and adequate time and facilities for
preparation. Human Rights Watch has pointed out84 that the statute’s provision requesting the lead
defence council to be an Iraqi national effectively excludes any lawyer with experience in the
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complex procedures connected to crimes of such a magnitude as genocide and crimes against
humanity (e.g. gained through working at the ICTY or ICTR).

It has also been criticised that the tribunal does not require the guilt of the accused to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, as typically required in common law countries and as required in front of
the ICTY, ICTR or ICC.85 Instead the Tribunal will find a verdict “based on the extent to which it is
satisfied by the evidence presented (…).“

86

On the other hand it has been said that the “beyond a

reasonable doubt” standard is unheard of in many civil law countries.87 It all in all will heavily
depend on how the IHCC will apply the standard provided by the statute. The same is true for the
application and interpretation of the enlisted Iraqi crimes in the tribunal’s jurisdiction which due to
their extremely vague and broad wording are open to very arbitrary interpretation.

Art. 14 ICCPRfurther more includes the general requirement of:

“a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.”

In this regard major problems arise especially out of the highly instable security situation in Iraq.
With hardly a day without terrorist attacks that have even been precisely targeted against members
of the defence, fair trial proceedings are much harder to guarantee. Human Rights watch pointed out
the “serious obstacles that the defence may encounter in locating and protecting witnesses on behalf
of defendants, obtaining access to documents and securing the attendance of international experts it
may wish to call in support.”88
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And even with considerable protection offered by the Court employing U.S. or U.S. paid security
forces the defence is likely to encounter problems as it will often need to rely on people who
strongly oppose the coalition’s involvement as well as the IHCC and its jurisdiction.

Due to the highly insecure situation the court has to rely even more on coalition forces and foreign
personnel that may at least be perceived as biased and having an own interest at stake in the
proceedings. As weapons of mass destructions were never found and the ties between Al Qaida and
Saddam were at best very remote the only remaining justification that might be accepted by the
public is the argument that the intervention was necessary to stop ongoing and massive human rights
violations committed by the dictator now on trial. An acquittal how ever unlikely would therefore be
detrimental for the coalition’s remaining moral justifications for the war.89

In response to the killings of defense attorneys, the Iraqi Bar temporarily boycotted the court and the
defense several times requested the trial to be moved to a location outside Iraq.90 The court has
however rejected and dismissed the motions filed, apparently without providing any written
explanation or statement elaborating on its ruling.

The decision to use a purely national tribunal composed solely of Iraqi judges poses more problems.
The impartiality of the judges as well as their legal expertise is doubtful. It has to be kept in mind
that the court is applying international criminal law when it considers war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide which are no easy and clear cut provisions and the statute itself points out
that the court may resort to the decisions of International Criminal Courts in interpreting these

89
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crimes.91 Although their knowledge and intelligence has been praised by those U.S. experts in
international law chosen by the Department of Defence to train them92, they will surely not have the
expertise somebody would have who worked in this area for years or was even involved in legal
disputes before the ICTY or ICTR. Just as somebody might explain you in great detail how to drive
a car this obviously does not substitute own practice or ensure that the trainee will actually do a good
job. Furthermore the people who trained the judges (and whom the judges might rely on when
difficult legal questions arise) were chosen by one of the parties involved in the conflict. Even if
these experts did not present a biased view, the way they were chosen is open to critique and does
not help to promote the perception of fair and impartial tribunal judges. According to the New York
Times some of the trial judges are also relying on American Officials to arrange green cards for
them to move to the U.S. after the trials are over, as taking part in the trial would end any prospect of
leading a normal life in Iraq93.

The judges might also have somehow been personally affected by Saddam’s suppressive reign. The
court has been subject to a de-Ba’thification and the Statute excludes any person who has previously
been a member of the disbanded Ba’th Party from working on the court.94 Exclusion on the basis of
Ba’th party membership makes it more likely that the remaining judges have either directly or
indirectly been personally subject to the regime’s suppression. As Professor Newton who took part
in training the Judges points out in connection to the “pool of Iraqis that were initially considered for
various positions inside the Iraqi Special Tribunal” – surprisingly without addressing the threat to
impartiality – :
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“As a microcosm of Iraqi society, the overwhelming majority of that original group of
96 legal professionals had suffered the loss of immediate family members to the
criminal act of the regime. One judge was the only survivor of seven brothers.95”

A judge who is personally involved to such an extent is obviously in great danger of rendering a
biased decision not based on the rule of law. Rule 7.4 of the Rules of Evidence does however require
a judge to withdraw from any case in which his impartiality or independence may reasonably be
doubted and Rule 8 allows any party to challenge a judge’s impartiality. Although these rules are an
important tool to help to ensure an impartial trial, they will also need to be applied in a manner that
will ensure impartiality and not allow picking judges, that have suffered the loss of family members
or close friends to the acts of the regime.

In a personal talk with Professor Newton he assured me that most of the judges in the original pool
were later disqualified by the Iraqis as they were afraid of a possible threat to impartiality.

However, the newly presiding judge on the court, Judge Raouf Abdul Rahman is a Kurd from the
city of Halabja, which is the city that was so severely targeted by Saddam during the Anfal
campaign. According to Professor Newton, Judge Raouf was originally even supposed to preside
over the Anfal trial before he was redirected to be the new presiding judge in the current proceedings
when Judge Amin decided to resign.

When the presiding judge Rizgar Amin resigned early this year, he highlighted another threat to the
trial’s fairness: political interference in the courts independence. As pointed out, Saddam has been
declared guilty by high officials such as the Iraqi President Jalal Talabani who wanted the trial to
start as soon as possible and said: “Saddam is a war criminal and he deserves to be executed 20
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times a day for his crimes against humanity” or Abdul Aziz Hakim, leader of the largest political
party in Iraq, according to witch “this criminal deserves the death penalty, the highest
punishment.”96 This fact by itself would not be so troubling as long as there was no actual
interference with the court’s work. But as membership in the Ba’th Party was a prerequisite for
admission to judicial training under the former government97 the IHCC Statute’s Art. 33 deba’thification provision would exclude most qualified lawyersfrom the court and it apparently has
not been enforced strictly but rather selectively by Iraq’s new rulers and was employed to pressurize
the court.98 When 19 members of the court were supposed to be excluded under this provision Iraq’s
president interfered to block the effort.99 Others have however been expelled from the court under
this rule. When Judge Rizgar Amin, the presiding judge, resigned, he complained about
governmental interference after he had been repeatedly criticized by Iraqi politicians for being to
lenient with Saddam.100 The judge that was actually supposed to take his seat from within the
judiciary panel apparently was sidestepped under Art. 33 and Judge Raouf became the new presiding
judge.101 Of the panel of 5 judges who started out on the trial 3 have been replaced.102 This sort of
selective enforcement poses a great risk to the trial’s fairness and the independence and impartiality
of the court.

So is the trial fair? A final assessment is hardly possible at this point in time but it is clear that the
trial is facing grave challenges and the odds are not in favour of fair proceedings. Although there are
visible efforts to arrange for a fair trial, the security situation the trial is been held in, which allowed
for the assassination of members of the court and the defence team, the pressure from inside Iraq, the
executive’s involvement and the reliance on the coalition to conduct the trial as well as the lack of
96
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experienced judges in international law and their training through the U.S. have created a situation
which is very far from being ideal

D) THE PERCEPTION OF THE TRIAL

In the light of the aforementioned the trial is not only in danger of actually not complying with the
ICCPR standard for a fair trial but it might also not be perceived as fair by the Iraqi as well as by the
world audience. As pointed out in the introduction the court needs to serve different purposes,
besides helping to deter other heads of state around the globe from engaging in similar actions there
is the hope that it might reconcile victims, offer public acknowledgment of crimes committed and
serve as a model trial for the post Saddam Iraqi justice system. Especially concerning the latter
aspects it is not only important that the court will actually hold a fair trial but that this trial will also
be perceived as such.103 Even if close scrutiny might one day reveal that the procedures were
actually fair and in conformity with international standards, a trial that is not believed to be so by the
overwhelming majority of the audience watching, will leave the victims unsatisfied, will not
reconcile the country or provide for a positive new start. If people end up thinking of this trial as
victor’s justice, where the powerful simply hold a mock trial over the imprisoned and per se guilty, it
will be a failure. At best the perception might change over the years and essays and books written
might prove that the trial - if so - was actually fair but this will be too late to achieve many of the
goals set.

The trials shortcomings and possible stumbling blocks have been pointed out and the audience
seems to be highly sceptical about it. While reactions concerning the trial are mixed, in Iraq some
still support Saddam whereas many others want him to be executed immediately most of the
reactions directly addressing the fairness of the trial are troubling. Far from being a representative
study - which would be worth undertaking – you find the following statements about the trial: “It`s
103
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a historic farce, not a historic trial”104, “He won’t get a fair trial in Iraq”105, “This is just a show to
distract the Iraqi people”106, “Everyone agrees, ask anyone you want if it's a fair trial. They'll all
say it's unprofessional. It's simply a farce. I've never seen in my life such a trial107.” “These are the
occupiers so if you're talking about public perception, this is what comes across into homes.108” By
referring to his contacts in Iraq Professor Bassiouni points out: “My impression is that there are two
distinct scenes that are playing out contemporaneously. The first is the witnesses’ testimony which
is touching people’s hearts, and the defendants and their lawyers, which are playing on national
pride since the trial is seen in part as being the U.S. vs. Saddam. In short, it is like having a 2-ring
circus.”109

G) ALTERNATIVES – PRESENT & PAST

Looking at the fair trial pitfalls of the current tribunal, the question arises whether there were any
alternative venues to prosecute Saddam as well as what can still be done to improve the present
situation.

As a starting point the trial could be moved away from Baghdad and outside of Iraq. Although a trial
in the country where the crimes were committed, close to the general public, the victims, witnesses
and the locations of the crimes is generally favourable to a trial held abroad as it also offers the
additional advantage of “facility building,”, Baghdad does not do the trial any good. As pointed out,
the lack of security in Iraq and its capital leads to insufficient protection for defence lawyers, judges,
104
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witnesses, court personal, international advisors and (foreign) experts which threatens to undermine
the trial’s fairness. Especially international experts and advisors might be reluctant to travel to
Baghdad to testify. Also, with security the way it is, the trial is already removed from the public as it
is held in a fenced of zone, which is heavily guarded, allowing only restricted access to the court.110
Further more the political pressure is high on the court just as the level of reliance on coalition forces
to conduct the proceedings.

It has however been argued that no place is really safe from terrorist attacks111 and that moving the
proceedings would be “subordinating civilized society to the forces of anarchy and lawlessness.112”
And although the deaths of the defense counsels were tragic, they themselves had decided to have
their names and faces broadcasted during the trial and denied security protection offered by the court
through U.S. forces.113 The argument that protection by the court might lead to an interference with
the work done by the defense as their every step would be followed by coalition security forces –
very likely perceived as biased by the defense and the witnesses it wants to rely on - has been
rejected with the argument that in a civil law system such as Iraq, the neutral investigative judge has
already conducted the whole investigation and the lawyers therefore need not do so themselves..114
Finally it has been said that moving the trial would delay it and pose serious problems to the defense
to present their witnesses to the court. 115

But none of these arguments are convincing. The argument that moving the trial might seem like
surrendering to terrorist attacks, is a dangerous one when talking about an individual’s right to a fair
trial. It is against the very idea of human rights as rights of individuals to decide not to move a trial
out of a symbolic reason – not to give in to terrorists - while thereby sacrificing a fair trial for the
110
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individual concerned. And even though the Iraqi system employs an “objective investigative judge”
it is of course part of a good attorney’s job to dig out as much evidence as he can to support his
client, to find witnesses not found by the judge and move every stone possible to prove his case.
Maybe in a stable environment, when trying an easy case, the argument that the neutral investigative
judge has done all necessary discovery deserves some credit, but surely not in cases of this
magnitude. The proceedings before the ICTY and the ICTR have shown that trials for genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity are no easy cases. They involve thousands of pages of
documents and by affecting many peoples’ lives, they involve so much evidence and potential
witnesses that by no means an attorney can assume to have all relevant documents on his table when
seeing the investigative judge’s results. And whereby it is probably true that no place is absolutely
save when it comes to terrorist attacks, a place like Dubai116 surely is much safer than terror stricken
Baghdad with a strong insurgency still fighting coalition forces and daily bombings.

Although the ICTR and ICTY have been criticised for the problems resulting out of their distant
location away from the place where the crimes have been committed they surely did prove that such
trials are possible and that an adequate defense can be guaranteed. Witnesses are flown in to Arusha,
Tansania where the ICTR sits.117 Furthermore the decision not to accept protection by the defence
counsels can not function as an excuse to ignore the danger that these attacks pose for a fair trial.
The defense does not recognise the tribunal as legitimate and accuses the occupation as being
illegal.118 It does cause severe problems for a defense lawyer to take this position and nevertheless
accept protection offered to him by this very institution, especially as a reliance on the courts
protection would be clearly visible for everyone (the heavy armoured cars and up to 15 body
guards119 can hardly be hidden). If the defense prefers to move the trial this should therefore be
seriously considered by the court.
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Aspects criticised also arise out of the heavy involvement of the coalition which could have been
avoided by more and heavy international support. A prosecution before the newly created
International Criminal Court (ICC) was however not an option as the ICC Statute does not allow
prosecutions for crimes committed before it came into force120 on 01. July 2002.121

But there were two other alternatives: the first one was the creation of a hybrid tribunal relying on a
mixture of Iraqi nationals and international legal experts from around the world for the positions of
judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys. The original IST statute, subsequently amended, at least
made the appointment of international legal experts obligatory, even though only as advisors to the
court. But just as in Sierra Leone the tribunal could have been set up in cooperation between the
U.N. and Iraq. Heavy U.N. instead of U.S. involvement would certainly have given the tribunal more
legitimacy in fact as – and of equal and great importance - in perception. However it has been
claimed that Iraq was willing to prosecute Saddam by itself and furthermore that Iraq insisted on the
death penalty which would not have been available with U.N. involvement. Although this might be
true there are obvious similarities with Rwanda which also wanted to have the prosecutions take
place within its country and favoured the death penalty.122 A trial in Rwanda was however
considered to be impossible by the Security Council and in the light of the clear fair-trial provisions
of the ICCPR, the role-model character of the proceedings and the reconciliation of the country, one
can only agree with Justice Goldstone who pointed out:

“either you have fair trials or you do not have trials at all”.123
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If Iraq can’t guarantee a fair trial by itself it should therefore not hold the trial.

The comparison with Rwanda highlights the second possibility: the establishment of an ad hoc
tribunal by the Security Council under its Chapter VII power as in the cases of the ICTR and the
ICTY. There has been criticism about these tribunals as trials were lengthy and costly, too remote
from the victims and the public but there was no opposition to their fairness. These tribunals are also
less likely as being perceived as victor’s justice but rather as part of an evolving international
criminal legal order. A trial of this importance would have been worth a new tribunal which
arguably would also have led to a greater deterrence for any other potential international criminal as
it would have resembled a further step towards a truly international criminal system in which
perpetrators who have committed international crimes are prosecuted by an international forum.

Although these alternatives were considered, the current U.S. administration did not want to follow
this path and from an early stage on was opposed to the idea of an international tribunal but preferred
a national tribunal, possibly also because this it could help fashion and influence.124

IV.

CONCLUSION

Whereas the current tribunal might be called legitimate after its “adoption” through the Iraqi people
and it can exercise jurisdiction over the ex-dictator it might not be able to conduct a fair trial. Many
already believe that it actually does not do so.

The lack of a broad international involvement in the invasion of Iraq, in the installation of the court
and in the trial’s conduct which might eventually lead to the imposition of the death penalty widely abolished throughout this world’s democracies - has apparently also led to a broad
international opposition against the proceedings. As U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice
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pointed out, there was an effective boycott of the trial.125 This boycott will surely not promote the
perception of the trial’s success or the court’s legitimacy and is regrettable when looking at the
importance of the trial.

An international tribunal or one with major international involvement conducting the trial outside
Iraq could have avoided many of the problems the local national court is facing today and it
therefore would have been the better solution. Even though the road to the ICC was barred in order
to prosecute Saddam, his trial in Baghdad highlights the advantages of an international court.
Growing acceptance of this assessment might lead to the paradox situation in which the decision for
a national tribunal without broad international support or involvement in Baghdad could finally end
up promoting the idea of a strong international criminal court.
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“Rice hits boycott of trial of Saddam”, The Washington Times, December 14, 2005, available at
http://washingtontimes.com/world/20051213-100045-8045r.htm.
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